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ABSTRACT:  It is widely assumed that a fundamental contradiction exists between 
multiculturalism and ethnocracy.  As a result, there has been a distinct lack of research 
investigating the strategic relationship which can and does exist between both theories in 
practice.  This article sets out to overcome this gap through an examination of state policy 
towards the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel.  It identifies certain limits to the conceptual 
frameworks typically used to investigate multiculturalism and suggests that the range of 
policy options open to ethnocratic regimes is, in fact, far more malleable, selective and 
flexible than has hitherto been described. 
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The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) proudly proclaims multiculturalism to 
be an inalienable fact of Israeli society.
1
  With a population of over 7 million people 
belonging to a wide range of ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, political and regional 
groupings, this claim would appear to be consistent with the demographic realities of Israeli 
society.  However, not all of these differences carry equal significance.  Split between a 
Jewish majority which accounts for 75 per cent of the population and a Palestinian Arab 
minority which accounts for a further 20 per cent of it, Israeli society is distinguished by its 
prominent Jewish-Arab national divide.
2
  For this reason, any discussion of Israeli 
multiculturalism has remained both a problematic and highly controversial affair.
3
   
This paper tackles the controversy surrounding multiculturalism and explores whether 
it is legitimate to refer to state policy towards the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel in 
multicultural terms.  This paper begins by outlining some of the major sensitivities and 
assumptions associated with the use of the term “multiculturalism” in Israel.  It will then trace 
the roots of this controversy back to a wider international dissonance concerning the nature 
and definition of multiculturalism and disentangle three substantively different approaches to 
multiculturalism.  The next section of this paper will define the local parameters affecting the 
application of multiculturalism in Israel, namely, the disputed nature of the Israeli state and 
the structural framework within which its policies towards the Palestinian Arab minority are 
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formulated.  Finally, two particular examples of minority policy in Israel will be assessed in 
order to demonstrate the relevance and functionality of multiculturalism in practice in Israel.  
This paper will then conclude by suggesting a number of useful insights which an integrated 
analysis of multiculturalism can provide not only to our understanding of state policy towards 
the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel but also of the continued relevance of multicultural 
policies in a broader, international context.       
 
Multiculturalism: A Disputed Term 
 
Within the Palestinian Arab minority descriptions of Israel as a multicultural state 
remain few and far between.  Indeed, many are quick to dismiss the multicultural label as 
nothing more than a convenient (but disposable) rhetorical device that is used by the 
authorities, and other pro-establishment elements, for the sole purposes of currying 
international favour and concealing the systemic discrimination which they experience as 
non-Jewish citizens of the state. Similarly, few Israeli Jewish voices – whether critical or pro-
establishment – exist which have sought to describe the state in multicultural terms.  This 
reluctance is not restricted to assessments of state policy towards the Palestinian Arab 
minority but is particularly evident with regard to the internal discourse on intra-Jewish 
diversity.
4
 
What can be said to unite both Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish viewpoints is the 
shared view that multiculturalism runs counter not only to Zionist ideology but also to the 
fundamental idea of a Jewish nation-state.
5
  That Israel could simultaneously be considered to 
be both a Jewish and a multicultural state would, as such, appear to be contradictory and 
illogical.  Demonstrating the difficulty many Israelis have in reconciling the Jewish character 
of the state with the concept of multiculturalism, the leader of the extremist Jewish national 
party, Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Is Our Home), Avigdor Lieberman, has gone so far as to decry 
the notion of Israel as a multicultural state not only as being deeply antithetical to Jewish 
national interests but also as an existential threat to the preservation of the Jewish state.  
Thus, for Lieberman, multiculturalism is ranked on the same level of “threat” as calls from 
within the Palestinian Arab (and certain critical Israeli Jewish circles) to transform Israel 
either into a bi-national state or a secular “state for all its citizens”.6   
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Despite these objections, certain features of Israeli state policy have often been 
referred to and described as multicultural.  With regard to the Palestinian Arab minority, this 
paper identifies three major areas where this has occurred.  The first is the system of separate 
national identification and recognition in Israel.  In Israel, the concept of “nationality” 
(le’om) is distinct from that of “citizenship” (ezrahut), with the Hebrew term le’om signifying 
ethnic affiliation or national grouping.  As such, the Israeli Ministry of the Interior (MOI) has 
been able to recognise no less than 137 different possible “nationalities” to which Israeli 
citizens may belong.
7
  It is important to note, however, that while the MOI recognises a 
“Jewish”, “Arab” and “Druze”8 nationality, the category “Israeli” nationality does not exist.9  
As such, nationality is not only an important source of communal identity for Israeli citizens, 
but it has practical implications for the range of rights and obligations extended towards, and 
expected of, each individual in turn.
10
  For instance, all citizens who are registered by the 
MOI as belonging to the so-called “Arab” nationality are exempted from performing 
mandatory military service, while members of the Jewish, Druze and Circassian nationalities 
are not.  While this system of national categorisation provides important insights into the 
complicated nature of identity politics in Israel (notably the categorisation of Druze within a 
separate non-Arab nationality and the absence of a Palestinian Arab national category), it can 
also be argued that this system of separate group recognition subscribes to an essentially 
multicultural format based on the recognition of difference in society.   
A second area of Israeli state policy which is regularly cited as an example of 
multicultural policy is the system of separate religious accommodations.  The state officially 
recognises a total of 14 separate religious authorities: one Jewish, one Muslim, one Druze, 
ten Christian and one Baha’i.  Separate state recognition provides these communal authorities 
not only with a legal status unavailable to other unrecognised religious denominations but 
with a large degree of autonomy in the administration of matters pertaining to faith and 
religious practice as well as in the jurisdiction of personal status issues (marriage, divorce, 
births and deaths), holy sites and religious endowments (awqaf).  Each recognised religious 
authority also has a range of institutions at its disposal – including a system of religious 
courts and appointed judges – to apply religious law as well as to legislate on personal, 
family and other matters.    
The last area of state policy which has often been described in multicultural terms is 
education.  Education in Israel consists of four main, but separate, strands or educational 
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tracks: secular state (for Jews), secular state (for Arabs), religious state (for Jews only) and 
private.  The vast majority of Palestinian Arab students in Israel attend either free Arab state-
run schools or private schools which are, on the whole, run by Christian religious authorities.  
While Arab state schools fall under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education which 
is responsible for setting its distinctive curriculum, appointing its staff and maintaining its 
buildings, private schools run by religious authorities enjoy a significant level of autonomy, 
from both an administrative and financial point of view.  Thus, private schools in the Arab 
sector teach a separate “Arab” curriculum using Arabic as the main language of instruction.  
 
Critical Multiculturalism: A Theoretical Background 
 
While these three areas appear to conform with multicultural expectations, the 
question remains how these policy provisions, together with the assertions of the MFA, can 
be reconciled with the common objection that Israel cannot truly be considered to be a 
multicultural state.  This article suggests that the origin of this confusion and disagreement 
lies in the poorly-defined conceptual frameworks which have been used to define and explore 
multiculturalism itself.  The terminological slippage between multiculturalism and the 
competing vocabulary of cultural pluralism and interculturalism has led Wieviorka to suggest 
that multiculturalism has become a much misunderstood, neglected and even maligned 
subject within the social sciences.
11
  Given this, it is not an understatement to say that 
multiculturalism can and does mean many different things to many different people.  For 
some, it can mean nothing more than a description of diversity in society, as demonstrated by 
the MFA.  For others, it assumes a commitment to a certain set of values and normatively 
positive and affirmative assessments of diversity in society.  For others still, multiculturalism 
implies the existence of a particular set of differential policies which regulate social, cultural 
or ethnic differences between groups in society.  Despite the overlap between each of these 
perspectives, it is clear that each one assumes a markedly different starting point and 
substantive outlook.  As a result, a number of thorny questions arise which must be 
addressed.  Is it sufficient, or acceptable, for instance, to describe a state in multicultural 
terms based only on the mere existence of diversity in society?  Similarly, must a society or 
state hold fast to, or forego, a particular set of ideological assumptions in order for it to be 
considered multicultural?  Can a state apply multicultural policies in the absence of an 
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ideological attachment to multicultural values?  Must all three exist at the same time for a 
state to be defined as multicultural?  Can any state be truly multicultural?  The list of 
unanswered questions goes on.   
Despite the apparent deadlock, it is possible to build a tentative framework through 
which initial responses to these questions can be ventured.  The framework used here consists 
of two levels, the first of which aims to deconstruct the different conceptual approaches to 
multiculturalism while the second elaborates the differences between each approach in turn.  
With regards to the first task, this article subscribes to Inglis’ typology which recognises 
three “interrelated, but nevertheless distinctive” categories of multiculturalism.12  The first 
usage is that of “demographic-descriptive” multiculturalism – incidentally, the most common 
of the three varieties in public and political discourse today – which assumes that 
multiculturalism represents nothing more than the mere existence of diversity in society and 
is, essentially, a reflection of empirical “facts on the ground” devoid of any normative 
interpretation or political obligation.  Distinct from this, is a second conceptual category of 
“ideological-normative” multiculturalism, which states that multiculturalism must extend 
beyond the mere acknowledgement of diversity in society to an adherence to a particular set 
of multicultural values and ideas.  According to this variant, difference is not only considered 
to be a natural and positive phenomenon in society, but one which should be protected both 
for the sake of the individual and for the good of society as a whole.  Ideological 
multiculturalism assumes two basic rationales.  On the one hand, it stresses that the individual 
in society is inextricably bound up with a wider social collective, and that the provision of 
individual civic rights alone is insufficient to the fulfilment of the basic rights and needs of 
the individual.  Group rights are, therefore, considered to be as central and as indispensable to 
human rights as individual civil liberties.  On the other hand, this approach also considers 
social conflict to be latent within all diverse societies as the needs and interests of different 
groups are prone to collide and compete with each other in their respective struggles for 
expression, development and power.  Such conflict can only be managed, and political 
stability maintained, by recognising this tendency and according an equal level of 
recognition, respect and rights to the different groups which together make up the fabric of 
society.  As such, if one group becomes disproportionately powerful or dominant in society, 
there is an increased probability that inter-group conflict and political instability will follow. 
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Finally, the third category of “programmatic-political” multiculturalism judges 
multiculturalism according to the practical implementation of differential policies.  Inglis 
defines this category as consisting of the range of “specific types of programs and policy 
initiatives used to respond to and manage ethnic diversity” in society, while Wieviorka 
considers it to be “the institutional and political arrangements which explicitly refer to 
multiculturalism” or, more generally, as “multiculturalism in practice”13.  As it is the 
relationship between ideological and programmatic multiculturalism which holds the key to 
this discussion, the subtle differences in meaning between “multicultural policy” and policies 
which “refer” to multiculturalism, as Wieviorka puts it, are of particular relevance.  
Before examining the nature of the association between ideological and programmatic 
multiculturalism, let us briefly reassess the question of whether or not Israel can be referred 
to in multicultural terms.  From the point of the view of the first definition, whereby diversity 
alone is its measure, Israel can be considered to be a multicultural society par excellence.  In 
fact, there are very few places in the world that have as pronounced a level of ethnic, 
religious, national, linguistic and social diversity as Israel.  Yet, from the point of view of the 
ideological-normative usage or register, the term “multiculturalism” immediately falls down.  
Israel, as this article argues, is a Jewish ethnocratic state, whereby the majority of Israeli 
(Jewish) citizens believe not only in the importance of maintaining Jewish numerical, cultural 
and political superiority in society, but also in their right to do so.
14
  It is at this ideological 
juncture that examinations of “Israeli multiculturalism” have usually run aground.   
This suspension of inquiry emanates from a single major assumption which is that 
there is, or should be, a certain chronological and hierarchical order between the descriptive, 
ideological and programmatic levels of multiculturalism.  Accordingly, it is assumed that 
Israel cannot be considered to be a multicultural state in practical or political terms if it is not, 
first and foremost, a multicultural state in ideological terms.  This notion would appear to be, 
at first glance, quite logical.  How can a policy be considered to be multicultural if the state 
which formulates and enforces it embraces a very different political philosophy and 
worldview?  Surely, such a claim is as misguided as considering certain democratic features 
within non-democratic states to be testimony of a broader ideological commitment to 
democratic principles?  Upon further inspection, however, this reaction is fundamentally 
misguided itself, or, at the very least, misplaced, as, on the one hand, it assumes the existence 
of a unified, coherent system of thought which, with respect to multiculturalism, clearly does 
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not exist, and because, on the other hand, it serves to collapse the boundaries that separate 
each of the three distinct categories or registers of multiculturalism from one another thus 
stymieing a full and critical inspection of the role and use of multiculturalism in practice.   
As a result, this article challenges those who reject any examination of Israel in 
multicultural terms.  Given Inglis’ assertion that the three approaches to multiculturalism are 
“interrelated, but nevertheless distinctive”, this article suggests that the disjuncture between 
ideological and programmatic multiculturalism not only does exist but is also quite common.  
By decoupling assessments of programmatic multiculturalism from its presumed ideological 
foundations, the path is made clear to investigate anew the nature of Israeli multiculturalism 
and the practical dimensions of multicultural policy in Israel. This approach has been made 
possible by a significant body of critical studies which point to the dislocated nature of 
multicultural policy even in states which are considered to be unequivocally democratic in 
nature.  A brief summary of the limits of multiculturalism as identified by these critical 
theorists is instructive here.  
The majority of attacks against multiculturalism have been formulated in what may be 
loosely referred to as the “West”.  While this regional and political specificity has engendered 
its own set of limitations, certain observations can be made which are useful to this 
discussion.  Criticism has generally focused on two aspects of multiculturalism: its 
ideological claims and its practicality.  With regard to the first, one common issue which has 
been raised is that, rather than promoting political stability within society, multiculturalism is, 
at its essence, a deeply divisive and fragmentary ideology which undermines and 
delegitimizes the basis for a single unified civic identity by stressing and, indeed, reifying 
differences rather than commonalities between groups.  Through a process of essentialising 
and institutionalising differences between groups, multiculturalism has also been accused of 
impeding and eroding not only the rights and liberties of the individual citizen but also those 
of the very groups which it is supposed to protect.  This encroachment on civil liberties is 
assessed from two different angles.  On the one hand, individual citizens are understood to 
have become “locked in” to a group identity which, for whatever reasons, does not, or no 
longer, reflects their best interests or preferred outlook on life, thus limiting their rights as 
individuals in society and under the law to chose their own path or to opt out of particular 
group affiliations.  On the other hand, multicultural recognition can cause group identities 
themselves to become artificial and entrenched as their capacity for further change is 
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obstructed by bureaucratic expectations and procedures.  In other words, multiculturalism can 
cause group identity to become oppressive straitjackets both to the individual and to the 
group in question.  Finally, some have charged that, given the bureaucratic measures required 
to make multiculturalism operational, traditional group leaders are empowered and, through 
their exercise of power, can become “forces for conservatism and clientelism” in society, thus 
imbuing multiculturalism with a further illiberal, and indeed oppressive, potential.
15
   
The second major line of attack against multiculturalism focuses on the achievability 
of multicultural norms in practice.  Given the indefinite and shifting number of possible 
group identities in society at any one time, it is argued that it is impossible, on the grounds of 
sheer practicality, for all groups in society to receive multicultural recognition and for that 
recognition to be measured out equally.  Multiculturalism in practice requires important 
decisions to be made concerning which groups in society will be selected to receive 
recognition (and which groups will not) as well as decisions surrounding the type of 
multicultural rights which will be extended to those groups (and, again, those rights which 
will not).   
At the source of each of these challenges lies the problematic and unresolved role of 
the state.  According to traditional multicultural theory, the role of the state should be 
restricted to one of neutral arbitration and impartiality between groups but, as Habermas 
points out, “it is not possible to decouple majority culture from the political culture”16 of any 
country, let alone an ethnocratic state such as Israel.  As such, critics of multiculturalism 
challenge the practical and political ability and likelihood of any state to accomplish the lofty 
mandate assigned to it by multiculturalists.  “Try as it might, the state has to have a public 
language, holidays, and certain particularisms that inevitably bear the mark of a majority 
group.”17  As such, the state is not only responsible for deciding the form, shape and extent of 
multiculturalism in society, but, given its own socio-political contingency, it is inextricably 
and inevitably biased in its decision-making process.  It is, as a result, possible to diagnose 
multiculturalism as dysfunctional or bipolar in nature.  While aspiring to serve as a force for 
inclusion, equality and protection, multiculturalism also conceals within it the negative 
capacity to divide, control and discriminate.  Others have gone so far as to charge 
multiculturalism with conspiring to repackage and disguise the chauvinistic and exclusionary 
potential of nationalism within the more politically correct and munificent dress of equality 
and recognition.
18
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An analysis of the imperfect and contingent nature of multiculturalism in practice is 
provided by Wieviorka who examines the role and impact of multicultural policy in four 
different countries which are most commonly associated with multiculturalism.  While it is 
beyond the remit of this article to analyse his conclusions in great length, a certain number of 
his observations will be touched upon here.  Discussing the role of multiculturalism within 
the Canadian context, for example, Wieviorka presents multiculturalism in practice to be 
essentially based upon a policy of selective bilingualism aimed at stabilising growing 
tensions between an Anglophone majority and a sizable Francophone minority.  As such, 
Canadian multiculturalism is understood to consist of the limited extension of recognition to 
two major groups in society only, resulting in the continued exclusion and marginalisation of 
other groups from the benefits of multiculturalism.  Moreover, multiculturalism does not 
extend beyond certain linguistic and educational rights, demonstrating not only the political 
bias of multiculturalism in practice in Canada but the politically instrumental role of 
multiculturalism itself in diffusing group tensions, reasserting social stability and maintaining 
political order. 
Wieviorka’s assessment of multiculturalism in practice within the Australian context 
is also revealing.  The first point which he stresses is that the Australian experiment with 
multiculturalism has been very different to the Canadian experience, reminding us that 
multiculturalism in practice can assume many different forms and shapes.  To begin with, the 
Australian variant is distinct in that its commitment to multiculturalism is not formalised as it 
is in the Canadian case.  While there is a wealth of specific legislation underscoring 
multicultural rights in Canada, Australian multiculturalism is guided more by a loose set of 
policy directions than it is by any constitutional obligation or commitment.  A second major 
difference between the two cases concerns the type of groups affected by the two respective 
multicultural projects.  While in the Canadian case multiculturalism is restricted to two large 
indigenous linguistic communities, the Australian version has focused upon economic rights 
with respect to various immigrant communities only.        
While the Australian case demonstrates a basic level of selectivity in terms of the 
types of groups that are recognised and the range of rights covered within it, it is also 
distinctive in the particular role which is accorded to multiculturalism within the broader 
political order.   Not only is English the only recognised national language in Australia, but it 
has “always been understood that the culture of the established society, its 
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political/administrative institutions, would retain its primacy”.19  As such, while 
multiculturalism has been used to bolster social cohesion and the integration of minorities 
within Australian society, it can also be understood to have structurally limited those 
minorities to a particular position in the pre-established social hierarchy. 
Wieviorka’s comparative analysis of multiculturalism in practice in these and other 
countries offers two major insights.  The first is that multiculturalism is not the guiding 
political ideology of any of the states which practice it.  Instead, certain multicultural features 
and values are incorporated, but ultimately subsumed, within a broader political ideology 
within which it plays its part.  The second major insight is that, regardless of the differences 
in implementation between each of the countries which have practiced it, multiculturalism 
has served as a response to the particular challenges faced by the state in maintaining both 
political stability and order within society.  In other words, multiculturalism in practice is a 
reactive rather than proactive phenomenon, contrary to what many multiculturalists assume.  
 
Ethnocratic Theory and Israel 
 
While Wieviorka’s study widens our understanding of multiculturalism in practice as 
a reflexive and contingent political project, its relevance for this study is nonetheless 
temporarily clouded by its focus on “western” democratic states.  As an ethnocratic state, 
Israel represents both an interesting test-case of the limits of multiculturalism in practice and 
of the nature of the relationship which can be said to exist between multiculturalism and non-
democratic or partially-democratic states.   
Ethnocratic theory first emerged in the 1990s as part of a growing body of critical 
Israeli studies which sought to provide a more effective conceptual and theoretical framework 
through which the nature of the Israeli state, and the relationship between its Jewish and 
democratic components, could better be reconciled and understood.  In particular, ethnocratic 
theory emerged as a direct response and challenge to the common assertion that the Israeli 
state can be both Jewish and democratic in equal measure.  In essence, ethnocratic theory 
posits that while certain democratic arrangements and procedures do exist in Israel, that they 
are structurally and ideologically subordinated to the dominant Jewish character of the state.  
This conclusion is supported by both the literature and various public opinion surveys: 
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On the declarative level, Israelis accord democracy a high level of support.  Once 
asked about particular democratic values such as minority rights and equality for 
non-Jewish citizens, that support breaks down.
20
             
 
Others have argued that there is a “conditional acceptance of democracy” in Israel and 
that “the ideological commitment to democracy has not always been unconditional among all 
political groups, and consensus has not always prevailed concerning the specific norms 
implied about the broad concept of democracy.”21  As a result, Yiftachel has defined 
ethnocracy to be “a non-democratic regime” which, “[d]espite several democratic features, 
mainly ethnicity (and not territorial citizenship) determines the allocation of rights and 
privileges” within it.22  Ethnocracies are identifiable, amongst other characteristics, by the 
presence of a “dominant ‘charter’ ethnic group” which “appropriates the state apparatus, 
determines most public policies, and segregates itself from other groups”.23  Thus, groups 
become segregated and stratified within an ethnocratic regime according to a particular ethnic 
order with the “charter group” at its head.  This stratified and asymmetrical system of 
governance has the knock-on effect of “enhancing a process of political ethnicisation among 
sub-groups”.  However, ethnocratic regimes usually attempt to legitimise and reinforce this 
asymmetric distribution of power through the promulgation of a particular historical and 
political narrative on the one hand and through the maintenance of “selective openness” on 
the other.  Selective openness is achieved internally through the maintenance of certain 
features and institutions which are apparently democratic but which ultimately serve 
undemocratic or non-democratic aims.  Thus, Yiftachel argues that ethnocratic regimes share 
with “façade democracies” the tendency to use “selective openness” strategically, and to 
great effect, in order to limit the power of political protest and opposition internally, and to 
maintain the legitimacy of the regime externally.
24
 
Given the selective openness of ethnocratic regimes and the subordinate and 
contingent nature of democracy in Israel, what role can multiculturalism be understood to 
play in the relationship between the Jewish state and its Palestinian Arab minority?  As one of 
the major bridges between ethnocratic and multicultural theory, critical control theory 
provides the answer to this question.  One of the earliest scholarly traditions which inspired 
the development of control theory in Israel was the critical neo-Marxist tradition of the late 
1960s as exemplified amongst others by Rosenfeld.  Within his various analyses of the 
village and the changing rural-urban dynamic of Palestinian Arab life in Israel, government 
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policy is described as deliberately maintaining and supporting the patriarchal leadership 
structure of the Arab village and of manipulating factionalism between the various hamules 
(extended families), which, he argues, is pursued in order to ensure the economic and 
political underdevelopment and dependence of the Palestinian Arab minority upon the state 
and its Jewish majority.
25
  In a later study, Rosenfeld advances this charge by arguing that the 
state deliberately “sharpened or revivified distinctions” between Muslims, Christians and 
Druze in a number of different ways.
26
  The exceptional status extended to Druze in the 
military; the relatively harsher treatment meted out to Muslims during the period of military 
rule (1948-66); the categorisation of each religious and even cultural grouping as distinct 
minorities (“‘the Christian minority,’ ‘the Druze minority’, ‘the Bedouin minority’”), and the 
politicisation of religious groups as “positive elements” or “negative elements” all 
contributed to exacerbating tensions within the minority and increasing state control.
27
  
Similarly, the provision of separate autonomous arrangements is understood to serve mainly 
as a vehicle of control over the minority. 
 
Distinctions were formalised and justified under the heady offering of cultural 
autonomy; local hierarchies for each of the sect groupings were formed and 
provided a legal status, and although they had effective control in personal 
matters (marriage, divorce, etc.), this tended to restructure internal authority 
specifically in religious terms, while attempting to center leadership around 
conventional personalities.
28
 
 
In addition to the creation of a dependent and conservative leadership within the 
Palestinian Arab minority, Rosenfeld also mentions the role of Arab Advisors and separate 
Arab sections of various ministries within the government as part of this broader policy of 
control which, he argues, was created not only to subdue the “Arab threat” but also in order 
to best advance the maximum expropriation of Arab lands into government hands. 
These themes are reflected in the writings of several other scholars of this period.  
Zureik, for instance, who describes Israel as a “settler regime”, identifies the role of 
institutional separation in the creation of a dependent and “coercive social structure” within 
Palestinian Arab society.
29
  Describing the media, economy and education system as “central 
socialisation agencies” in the creation of an asymmetrical political order that privileges the 
dominant group in society, he identifies the state’s plural policies as nothing other than a 
deliberate strategy aimed at undermining the coherence and unity of the minority as a whole.  
Within this, the separate Arab education system and curriculum are marks of “cultural 
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oppression” and subjugation.30  Similarly, Kanaana considers control to have been the 
inevitable policy consequence of the clash between an exclusive Jewish nation-state ideology 
and the particular challenges posed to it by a large non-Jewish minority.  Citing the state’s 
adoption of the millet (minority religious community) system, which provided separate 
recognition and a degree of communal autonomy to certain religious minorities during the 
Ottoman period, he argues that this system was “easily adapted to standard colonial divide 
and rule procedure” by the state in order to facilitate the expropriation of land, and their 
political and economic dependence upon the state.
31
  In describing the relationship between 
the state and its Palestinian Arab minority as being “based on privation, humiliation, coercion 
and national oppression”, former long-standing mayor of Nazareth, Tawfiq Zayyad, viewed 
the state’s insistence on identifying Palestinian Arabs in Israel as “a conglomeration of 
communities and religious minorities” as part of its broader refusal to acknowledge and 
recognise Palestinian Arabs as a single national minority.
32
  Thus the extension of differential 
recognition (and rights) of religious communities is linked with a parallel denial of 
recognition (and rights) of the Palestinian Arab national minority.  This politically charged 
vision of society has resulted in what he refers to as several “absurd” and “fabricated” 
theories, the most prominent of which is the notion that the Druze represent a separate non-
Arab nationality in Israel.
33
    
During the 1970s, the control perspective had also begun to influence the analyses of 
more pro-establishment writers who increasingly sought to reconcile the problematic status of 
a sizable Palestinian Arab minority within a Jewish state.   
 
However fairly, decently and compassionately Israel may treat its minorities, however 
sincerely it subscribes to democratic principles, egalitarianism, justice and fair play, 
political discrimination is built into the system.  A Druze, not to mention an Arab, must 
limit his ambitions. […] They must remain politically limited not merely because of their 
small numbers but because they are, a priori, not of the group which founded a nation on 
the basic premise that it was to be a Jewish state ruled by Jews.
34
  
 
Recognising certain limits to state policy, however, rarely translated into a more 
concrete analysis of the nature of state policy in practice.  Breaking with this silent tradition, 
Smooha offers the first major attempt to bridge the gap between both academic discourses.  
While arguing that the Israeli authorities remain more liberal in their attitude towards the 
Palestinian Arab minority than the general Israeli Jewish public, he demonstrates that they are 
nonetheless interested in engineering the “pacification” of the minority through a 
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combination of carrot-and-stick initiatives, whereby the “carrot” represents efforts to induce 
the voluntary “compliance” of the minority based on recognition of the obvious benefits, 
incentives and rewards pertaining to them as citizens of the state, while the “stick” 
encompasses their forced economic dependence on, and political subordination to, the Jewish 
majority.  Through “an effective machinoy of control-exclusion, dependence and 
subordination” Smooha describes state policy as attempting to minimise “the potential costs 
of the presence of an Arab minority to the core national goals of the Jewish character of the 
state, Israeli national security and democratic pluralism”.35 In a later study, Smooha goes on 
to highlight the limited nature of policy options available to the state given its parallel 
commitment to the Jewish character of the state.
36
  Discussing several possibilities, he 
concludes that full integration, bi-culturalism, and autonomy are all unrealistic options for the 
Jewish state.  His commentary on the impracticality of autonomy is particularly interesting. 
 
Israeli authorities have always considered Arab national autonomy a threat to Jewish 
domination and to the state’s political stability and have adopted diverse 
countermeasures to avert it.  These include depriving Arabs of control over their own 
institutions, preventing them from forming independent organisations, endeavouring to 
dismantle their majority status in certain regions, coopting their leaders, encouraging 
traditional internal divisions, and treating them as an ethnic rather than national group.  
These policies coupled with other restraints comprise the machinery of political control 
over the Arab minority.
37
       
 
Thus, it can be argued that whatever autonomous cultural or religious arrangements 
that do exist in Israel are both limited and hollow given the structural dominance of a political 
ideology which fears and rejects the provision of full or consequential autonomy.   
Despite acknowledging the centrality of control within the Israeli state’s minority 
policy, Smooha nonetheless fails to provide a clear analytical framework through which the 
control of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel can be routinely addressed.  Situating 
himself more solidly within international theories of structural pluralism, Lustick develops 
“an analytical framework for explaining the anomaly of political stability in deeply divided 
societies” that is based on notion of an Israeli system of control.38  Such systemic control is 
based upon three different but mutually reinforcing techniques: segmentation, dependence 
and cooptation.  While it is outside the scope of this article to discuss each of these 
techniques in length, it should be stressed how, within the Israeli system of control, internal 
differences within the Palestinian Arab minority are understood to represent “meaningful 
political categories” by the authorities.39  Thus, internal differences within the minority are 
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subject to politicisation and manipulation.  While it has already been shown how language 
and terminology play a central role in affecting the development of differential state policies 
towards education, religious accommodation as well as military service, Lustick’s 
contribution allows us to unite each of these parts within a broader and united analytical 
framework.  As such, it is “the network of mutually reinforcing relations” and the “reciprocal 
interdependencies” which have emerged within the Israeli system of control which is of 
relevance, and not any single policy or isolated measure within it.
40
   
While Lustick’s systemic approach highlights the complex, dialectical and evolving 
nature of these interweaving components of control, and the capacity for the overall system 
of control to change and adapt itself over time (as well as to provide unanticipated and 
undesired consequences for the state itself), his approach was weakened to some extent by 
the temporal limits of his research and his overly optimistic prognosis of how various 
“challenges to the system” would ultimately be resolved within it.  Lustick, as with Smooha 
and Rosenfeld before him, was primarily focused on the unique conditions which 
accompanied the period of military rule in Israel.  With the end of military rule in 1966 and 
the relaxation of the bulk of emergency regulations which had hitherto contained and 
repressed the Palestinian Arab minority, a new period of self-confidence and awareness 
emerged in Israel.  Faced with growing challenges to the Israeli system of control, both from 
within the Palestinian Arab minority and from within critical Israeli Jewish circles, Lustick 
assumed that, of the three different possible regime responses (“system adaptation, 
breakdown or transformation”), Israel would transform itself towards a situation of “effective 
binationalism”.41  In the intervening thirty years since the publication of his groundbreaking 
work, bi-nationalism remains a whisper on the political margins of Israeli politics.  It would, 
therefore, appear that Israel’s system of control has proven far more effective and resilient 
than he had expected.  Despite retreating slightly from his earlier understanding of the 
dialectical and dynamic nature of control in maintaining stability in deeply divided societies, 
and his inability to sufficiently recognise the structural potential for a sophistication of 
control, rather than an abandonment of it, Lustick’s approach forms a cornerstone to many 
subsequent analyses of state-minority relations in Israel today. 
 
Multiculturalism in Practice in Israel 
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The 1990s witnessed not only the emergence of ethnocratic theory but also of a new 
interest in the field of political geography, which focused on the growing sophistication of 
Israeli control measures.  This new discipline focused on issues of territorial state control 
through direct and indirect strategies of land planning, reform measures and zoning strategies 
which developed subsequent to the period of military rule.  While these new scholars were 
not primarily interested in issues of education or religious accommodation, a parallel surge of 
research interest into the subject of Druze identity which took place at the same time 
provided major advances in how state control measures over the minority could be 
understood.   
During the first decade of the state, the Druze were described and categorised, 
together with the remainder of the Muslim and Christian population, as Arabs.  However, 
when in 1956 Druze mandatory conscription into the military was legalised, it became 
necessary to justify the exemption of Muslims and Christians from military service, and to 
defend the exception that had been made for the Druze.  Some of the literature on the Druze 
points to the “special relationship” that had historically existed between Druze and Jews in 
the area, particularly during the war of 1948, as having at least partially inspired this move.
42
  
There is no reason to doubt that the Jews felt a measure of gratitude for the loyalty 
demonstrated by certain Druze villages.  Similarly, there is evidence that the Jews related to, 
and sympathised with, the vulnerable status of the Druze as a religious minority in the Middle 
East.  As a non-Muslim religious community which had been refused recognition within the 
Ottoman millet system, the state was eager to provide official recognition to them as a 
separate non-Muslim Druze religious category, which they did in 1957.  Five years later, the 
state went one step further by extending to them official recognition as a separate non-Arab 
Druze nationality.  This move, however, was far more controversial.  Writing in the mid-
1980s, Oppenheimer described this move as a cynical “manipulation of categories of identity 
and attributes of culture” by the state for the sole purposes of “ethnicising” and politicising 
Druze identity away from its Arab roots.
43
  Firro also described the state’s attempt to 
encourage “Druze neoparticularism” through a series of invented traditions (such as the use 
of the al-Nabi Shu’ayb shrine44 as a swearing-in ceremony for Druze military recruits) as an 
extension of its broader divide-and-rule policy towards the minority as a whole.
45
  In order to 
achieve its aims, the state sought out and empowered traditional and conservative Druze 
leaders who would be obedient to and dependent upon it for their own power before 
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providing them with separate communal institutions, most notably a separate Druze religious 
court system, which was formalised in 1964.  Having co-opted just such a conservative and 
patriarchal Druze elite, Hajjar has charged the state’s identity policy of also “sexualizing 
differences” within the minority and of having contributed to the high level of gender 
inequality and even oppression facing Druze women within their community today.
46
  The 
final move in separating the Druze from the Arabs and in institutionalising Druze difference 
came in 1976 with the introduction of a separate Druze curriculum.
47
   
The process of institutionalising Druze difference, which spanned more than two 
decades, produced few material benefits for the Druze.  This is particularly evident within the 
context of their remarkable military service record.  Over 40 per cent of the total Druze male 
labour force is dependent upon the army for jobs today.
48
  However, the significance of the 
military for young Druze men is not an incidental consequence of their mandatory 
conscription alone but grew in line with the steady decline of the traditional Druze 
agricultural economy upon which they were previously dependent and wide-scale 
government expropriation of arable Druze land.  By 1962, for example, more than two-thirds 
of Druze lands had been confiscated by the state with the result that, by the late 1990s, less 
than 1 per cent of this traditionally rural community was able to support itself through 
agriculture.
49
  Poverty, the lack of further education and the hierarchical nature of the Druze 
communal leadership structure further restricted the occupational avenues open to the Druze 
and increased their dependency upon the military.  The official rhetoric of state favouritism 
made little material difference to the Druze.  One significant influence which it did have, 
however, was that it increased both the sense of Druze entitlement based on their military 
service and their resentment of other segments of the minority which were exempt from 
military service but which were nonetheless enjoying a relatively better standard of life.  This 
disparity has contributed to growing intra-minority tensions and conflicts, most notably 
between Druze and Christians.
50
  
This is not to say that the Israeli authorities did not attempt to co-opt other segments 
of the minority into the military.  Indeed, voluntary military conscription is increasingly 
popular among Israel’s Bedouin community.  Attempts to recruit non-Bedouin Muslim or, 
indeed, Christian recruits have, however, proven more problematic.  This is due to the fact 
that Muslims and Christians – but particularly the former – continue to be viewed as potential 
“security risks” by the authorities.  However, this is not the only explanation.  In the 1950s 
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government officials did attempt to broach the subject of possible Christian conscription with 
local Greek Catholic religious leaders, but owing to the complicated hierarchical system of 
authority within the Catholic Church, and the relative administrative independence of local 
churches from the state, this venture failed to get off the ground.
51
 
This is not to say that multicultural policies have not affected the Muslim and 
Christian segments of the minority.  This is particularly true within the education sector.  As 
has previously been mentioned, the private school system represents – after the separate Arab 
state school system – the main educational provider for Palestinian Arabs in Israel.  While 
private education within the Arab sector falls under the jurisdiction of any of the Muslim, 
Druze or Christian religious authorities it has, in reality, been dominated by Christian church 
schools.  Church schools were first introduced in the late 1880s when British, German, 
French and subsequently also American foreign Christian missions established a network of 
schools, hospitals and churches in the region.  These schools, which were predominantly 
foreign-staffed and –funded, expanded with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire under 
the new administration of the British mandate in Palestine.  However, it was with the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948, that the role of church schools in the Arab sector in Israel was 
radically transformed when Christian religious institutions, which enjoyed extensive external 
networks and international support, were spared the worst excesses of government 
encroachment and interference in their affairs. 
While state-run public schools provide education to the majority of Palestinian Arabs 
to this day, places in private-run church schools are competitively sought after.  As the 
quality of education and educational facilities available in these schools is generally 
acknowledged to be of a superior standard to that available in state-run Arab schools, 
matriculating from a church school is widely believed to improve a student’s future 
opportunities.
52
  While church schools operate an open-door policy to students of all religious 
backgrounds, they nonetheless follow a selective admissions policy, reserving a set number 
of places in each class for Christian students even which this number is disproportionately 
higher than their proportion of the Arab student body.
53
  Given that private schools charge 
tuition fees which many Palestinian Arab families cannot afford to pay, church schools have 
developed a noticeable middle class reputation.  These factors, together with the 
concentration of church schools in built-up urban areas close to Christian centres (such as 
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Nazareth and Haifa) that are difficult to access by rural students have led many to categorise 
these schools as elitist.   
Sa’ar, who conducted a study on Christian identity in Haifa, observed a strong trend 
towards Christian ethnocentric behaviour by those who wish to downplay their national 
identity and highlight their internal religious identity for the sake of personal gain and 
advancement.  As this response is consistent with the state’s desire to categorise the 
population according to a religious framework of identity and to promote divisions within the 
minority as a whole, she deems this behaviour “socially reproductive”. 
 
By adopting a socially reproductive orientation – emphasising Christian cultural 
distinctiveness and drawing on the personal benefits that accompany political 
conformism – many Christians cultivate the hope (or the illusion) that they will 
be able to escape the class and civil subordination that they face as Palestinians in 
Israel.
54
    
 
Despite the prevalence of this orientation, she nonetheless observes a countertendency 
among Christians to emphasise their national identity at the expense of their religious 
identity.  This tendency demonstrates their “oppositional behaviour” to the state.  However, 
Sa’ar argues that both of these tendencies are, in fact, embodied within the Christian school 
system itself.  Church schools are attractive to Palestinian students because of their academic 
prestige, “the promise of individual success” and because they appear to have more 
independence from the state than public schools.  From the point of view of the state, the 
autonomy of the church schools is both threatening and convenient at the same time.  With its 
concentration of aspiring youth, church schools are, to a large extent, free from traditional 
control measures and, as such, serve as ideal sites for political mobilisation within the 
minority.  This threat is, however, diminished or minimised by the advantages which church 
schools offer the state.  On the one hand, they relieve the state of its own responsibility to 
supply the Palestinian Arab minority with an adequate and competitive education.  On the 
other hand, church schools are, by their nature, “highly conservative and apolitical in nature” 
thus serving as forces for political conformism.  As such, “Christian educational institutions... 
bear the dual potential of political obedience and opposition to the state or, in other words, of 
social reproduction and resistance”.55  
Both the autonomy allowed to church schools and the separate recognition extended 
to the Druze population illustrate two different forms of multiculturalism in practice in Israel.  
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In both instances, the state developed a policy towards different segments of the minority 
which was based on its selective recognition of religious differences within the minority.  In 
the case of church schools, the state adopted an indirect, laissez-faire attitude towards the 
historic Christian monopoly of private education in the Arab sector, while, in the case of 
“othering” Druze identity, the state applied a direct policy of cultural intervention and 
manipulation.  While both policies assume different forms and require different levels of state 
engagement, both were conducted and continue to be nurtured under the mantel of 
multiculturalism.  Both instances of multicultural policy facilitate – albeit to varying degrees 
– the maintenance of Jewish ethnocratic control over the Palestinian Arab minority through 
the institutional segmentation and asymmetric recognition of different group enclaves within 
it.  In other words, both instances of multicultural policy are important components of an 
ethnocratic system of control.     
 
Revisiting Multiculturalism 
 
Both the politicisation of Druze identity and the extension of administrative autonomy 
to private church schools demonstrate, in a practical manner, the sophistication of the Israeli 
system of control over time and the use of multicultural policies for the purpose of 
maintaining ethnocratic control over the minority as a whole.  Yiftachel has argued that 
Israel’s system of control is not only an integrated and inseparable component of Israeli 
ethnocracy, but that Israeli ethnocracy itself is based upon a system of control.  This paper 
goes one step further in arguing that instrumental or selective multiculturalism is both a 
viable and well-established policy option that is consistent both with the practical needs and 
long-term strategies of control within the Israeli ethnocratic regime.  Al-Haj coined the 
phrase “ethnocratic multiculturalism” to demonstrate the practical consistency between 
ethnocracies and multiculturalism in practice.
56
  This paper supports this view, but recognises 
that the use of multiculturalism in practice as an instrument of political control is, in fact, not 
limited to ethnocratic regimes.   While the State of Israel clearly does not conform to Inglis’ 
ideological register of multiculturalism, it is debatable to what extent any state can satisfy 
multicultural ideals.  As such, multicultural policy in Israel is not dissimilar to 
multiculturalism in practice in other international contexts to the extent that is as selective, 
limited, responsive and functional in nature as those cases have shown.  Where the Israeli 
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version of multiculturalism differs markedly from the experiences of other countries concerns 
the inherently greater level of political instability affecting it.  Given that ethnocratic regimes 
are preoccupied with the maintenance of asymmetrical and discriminatory power relations in 
plural societies, a greater level of control is consistently required in order to preserve the 
prevailing political order from internal dissolution or attack.  It, therefore, follows that 
multiculturalism in practice in Israel is subsumed within this greater need for control and, in 
the absence of a radical transformation of the political status quo in Israel, multicultural 
controls will continue to play a central role in the state’s policy towards its Palestinian Arab 
minority.   
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